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his book remains very selective in its coverage. For exam-
ple, while a certain kind of leftist might feel melancholy
in the face of communism’s defeat, there is a long and
philosophically rich left-wing tradition that did not suc-
cumb to melancholy. Anarchism, which surfaces periodi-
cally in the book, has a different arc than communism. It
bears mention that, contrary to Traverso’s tendency to
move seamlessly among the various historical currents of
leftism, from the time of the First International onward,
Marxists and communists did their best to suppress anar-
chist struggle in both memory and actuality. Today, anar-
chism holds a more powerful allure than communism and
generates enthusiasm among militants, even if it also ac-
knowledges defeats. Then, too, there are multiple cur-
rents of post-Marxism, which have theorized radical
democracy as an alternative to the millenarian dream
of revolution and have truly tried to move beyond the
determinism that clings to Marxist theory in order to re-
conceive history as open and indeterminate. This is a tradi-
tion I have addressed in Adventures of the Symbolic: Post-
Marxism and Radical Democracy (2013).
Insofar as Traverso appears to endorse the notion that
“communism needs to be rethought and rebuilt” (99),
without, of course, in any way indulging in nostalgia for
really existing socialism, it is surprising that he is silent on
current champions of precisely this project, figures such
as Slavoj Zizek, Alain Badiou, or Traverso’s colleague at
Cornell University, Bruno Bosteels. Instead, Traverso re-
visits the heavily trodden terrain of Adorno and Benja-
min, as if these figures are really the most relevant guides
to the Left’s present perplexity. Even in ending the book
with Daniel Bensaı¨d, who died in 2010, Traverso accentu-
ates Bensaı¨d’s flirtations with the melancholic messia-
nism of Benjamin but remains silent on Bensaı¨d’s
embrace of the new social movements, rejection of the di-
chotomy between reform and revolution, and willingness
to consider the strategy of forming broad party coalitions
on the Left. Traverso may be right that melancholy need
not only be a paralyzing and even conservative force.
After all, to put it in classic Freudian terms, the refusal or
inability to move beyond melancholy might express a cer-
tain kind of resistance, an obstinate refusal to accept de-
feat. Yet to leave the twenty-first-century Left under the
sign of Saturn neglects the efforts, past and present, to re-
turn the Left to the orbit of Mars.
WARREN BRECKMAN
University of Pennsylvania
STEVEN G. MARKS. The Information Nexus: Global Capi-
talism from the Renaissance to the Present. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. xiv, 250. $27.99.
The history of capitalism as a field of study suffers from
the problem that “capitalism” has no agreed-upon defini-
tion. Steven G. Marks’s book The Information Nexus:
Global Capitalism from the Renaissance to the Present as-
pires to provide a remedy. In a brief compass, the author
makes a refreshingly old-fashioned distinction between
capitalism as rhetoric, or rhetorical weapon, and capital-
ism as tangible reality. He defines that real, existing capi-
talism by its essential characteristics and defends it
against its chief rivals. And, as the book’s subtitle prom-
ises, he seeks to provide a definition with global reach,
shorn of Eurocentric blinders.
The book’s shorter first part reviews the nineteenth-
century origins of the term and the definitions offered
by early socialists and social scientists, especially Max
Weber, Werner Sombart, and Joseph Schumpeter. Marks
then follows capitalism’s rhetorical fate into the twentieth
century, as it was recruited for service in the Cold War. In
the course of his review, Marks dismisses substantive defi-
nitions of capitalism that emphasize capital accumula-
tion, wage labor, commodification, private property, the
division of labor, and the dominance of market relations.
This discussion is too brief and selective to be entirely
convincing, but it allows Marks to clear a path for his
preferred definition. Market economies are nearly uni-
versal, he argues, but something entirely new and es-
sential was added in early modern Europe, or, actually, in
seventeenth-century Northwestern Europe: a market
economy embedded within an information nexus. The
book’s longer second part traces the development of this
information nexus through its early modern European
commercial origins, its nineteenth-century industrial ex-
pansion, and its recent digital and global incarnation.
The centrality of information in the broadest sense of
the word to innovation and to economic efficiency is no
longer a novel claim, but this book makes a fast-paced,
abundantly annotated case for it that is accessible to his-
tory students and general readers. To keep such readers
engaged, Marks makes frequent allusions to contempo-
rary concerns, freely offering his opinions on a broad
range of issues.
The Information Nexus is a book with appeal, but it has
two notable weaknesses: one theoretical, the other his-
torical. Marks does not dwell sufficiently on what it
took—and takes—to achieve an information-rich envi-
ronment. Briefly stated, the challenge is to convert infor-
mation, which usually begins as a private good, into a
public good and to convert a mass of undigested informa-
tion into “useful knowledge.” Information is not costless.
Its supply depends in large part on the search efforts of
those who appreciate its potential value, while its social
value is much enhanced when it is able to circulate freely
among all social strata. Reconciling this contradiction re-
quires institutions that are hard to achieve and harder to
preserve. Moreover, while these institutions and practices
may take root first in the commercial world, they cannot
be confined to this realm. In time, they will affect science,
religion, culture, and politics as well. Marks’s account, by
focusing mostly on the supply of commercial information,
and by viewing its rising abundance primarily as a straight-
forward product of technology and state policy, makes
the achievement rather less remarkable than it really was.
His choices also handicap his later account of its historical
development.
His historical account of the origins of the information
nexus is fairly conventional. Marks does not seriously
amend accounts of capitalism that have been with us
since Weber: merchants in their towns developed a cor-
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porate sense and acquired an institutionalized voice; Eu-
rope’s fragmented political system was unable to control
the flow of information; once the Dutch Republic, fol-
lowed by England, established information-friendly politi-
cal regimes, true capitalism was up and running. Even if
we agree that no better explanation is yet possible, this ac-
count does not penetrate the interstices, as it were, of the
information nexus. It remains a black box.
As Marks turns to the information nexus during the
nineteenth-century rise of industrial capitalism, his story
becomes less surefooted. In this new world of the tele-
graph, railroads, multidivisional firms, and mass market-
ing, it is no longer clear whether information was the cata-
lyst of change or the end product. Nor is it clear whether
the information nexus was becoming more accessible or
more privatized, more exclusively held by those at the
peaks of corporate and imperial hierarchies.
These puzzles continue as Marks moves on to the con-
temporary scene. Today, we supposedly live in a “flat
world” of costless communication. Indeed, the current IT
revolution has done much to democratize access to infor-
mation, but it has simultaneously done much to concen-
trate income, wealth, and, hence, potential control over
information flows. The achievement of an “open access
order” is not a once-and-for-all thing.
Marks is certainly aware of this issue, and he addresses
it directly, but in my view unsatisfactorily. Toward the
end of the book, he raises a pressing contemporary ques-
tion: Does China’s economy count as capitalist? He con-
cludes that it does not, since China supervises and limits
the flows of information. It is therefore doubly surprising
to read, in the conclusion of this quick-paced review of
capitalism from its beginnings in the Dutch port towns to
the global present, that the information nexus of our time
is more a threat than a boon to economic vitality, and will
require that “the state . . . must function . . . as the active
patron and protector of the information nexus,” for its
own good (238). Perhaps the future of capitalism really
does lie in China.
JAN DE VRIES
University of California, Berkeley
COMPARATIVE/WORLD/TRANSNATIONAL
MARK SEDGWICK. Western Sufism: From the Abbasids to
the New Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Pp. ix, 350. $35.00.
This erudite and informative book is a sequel to the au-
thor’s Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the
Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (2004).
Whereas the latter discusses the vicissitudes of “tradition-
alism,” an amorphous religious-political and spiritual
movement aimed at recovering the primeval “Oriental”
belief and practice that the modern West has allegedly
failed to appreciate and embrace, Western Sufism focuses
on how Islamic asceticism-mysticism (Sufism), another
“Oriental” tradition, has been received and practiced in
the West from the fifteenth century to the present. The
geographical scope of Western Sufism is broad. Its pro-
tagonists (both Muslim and non-Muslim) with various
degrees of association with Sufism were highly mobile, es-
pecially in modern times. We find them journeying from
India and Russia to Europe, and from Indonesia, the
Middle East, and North Africa to North America. Mark
Sedgwick masterfully shows how and why they resided
permanently or temporarily in the West, contributing to
the cultural and spiritual needs of their publics.
In this sense, argues Sedgwick, Sufism was and still is
truly global in its outreach (249–250). His entire narrative
rests on the idea of seminal transcultural transfers: from
the Hellenic emanationism and mystical gnoseology of
Plotinus and his commentators to medieval Muslim
Baghdad and Iberia, to Jewish communities under Mus-
lim rule, and then “from Arab Muslim and Jewish philoso-
phy into Latin Christian philosophy” (253). Such momen-
tous transfers continued throughout the early modern pe-
riod, during which time Sufi ideas and imagery interacted
intimately with preexistent trends, intellectual fashions,
and controversies of the West, Martin Luther’s favorable
comparison of Sufis to Catholic monks in 1530 being the
oft-quoted example (71).
Heavily influenced by internal European debates and
often used as “ammunition” by disputants (79), Western
perceptions of the Sufis ranged from positive (Sufis were
compared to angels) to strictly negative (they were con-
demned as demonic and antinomian), even though their
social and doctrinal “deviancy” occasionally resonated
with the antidogmatic and anticlerical agendas of certain
Western intellectuals (see chap. 4). As was the case with
Islam generally, Sufism also served Westerners as a con-
venient forum for various religious, personal, and socio-
political statements. Hence the attention that Sedgwick
devotes to the highly complex and often elusive relation-
ships between his protagonists’ political views and their
engagements with various aspects of Sufism (258–259).
The heyday for Western Sufism coincides with the loss,
in the nineteenth century, of the Christian Church’s mo-
nopoly on the intellectual and religious life of Westerners
and the emergence, among some of them, of antidog-
matic and anticlerical universalism. The early decades of
the twentieth century witnessed the first initiations into
Sufism of Westerners by Westerners (e.g., of Rene´ Gue´-
non by Ivan Ague´li) and the establishment of first Sufi or-
ders in Western countries (chaps. 8 and 10). It was the
time when the Indian Sufi musician Inayat Khan trium-
phantly toured the West and Russia (chap. 9), and when
the Russian Empire e´migre´s George Gurdjieff and P. D.
Ouspensky introduced, under the guise of Sufism, new
practices, ideas, and perceptions of reality. In particular,
their teachings effectively replaced the age-old ideas—of
the soul aspiring to reunite with the Divine—with the
modern conceptions of consciousness and the possibility
of its expansion though special exercises performed indi-
vidually and collectively (176–181). Such ideas and prac-
tices soon won active and effective promoters, such as
John G. Bennett (181–183), whereas Inayat Khan’s uni-
versalist Sufism acquired a large, enthusiastic following in
Europe, Russia, New York, and California (156–166).
Building on two nineteenth-century movements, Tran-
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